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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

24 August 1978

*Not Sent*

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman, Security Committee

THROUGH:   
Executive Secretary  
Security Committee

FROM:   
Staff Member  
Security Committee

SUBJECT: Operational Security (OPSEC) - Recommendation  
for Presentation of Briefing to Security Committee

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation that the Army be formally requested to present an OPSEC briefing to the next or succeeding Security Committee meeting. My reasons are as follows.

2. During my recent ADT tour with the 902nd MI Group, I had occasion at the Group, Battalion, and Field Office level to observe the current OPSEC concept utilized by the Army for the past few years. Initially, I had the impression, which is perhaps shared by others, that OPSEC was a new military buzz word - this is not the case.

3. OPSEC is not a new concept. OPSEC was initiated as a result of a JCS directive in 1974; however, it has not been implemented by other services to the extent that it has in the Army. Basically, the concept as developed by the Army includes a multi-disciplined approach to security problems. In other words, instead of separate physical security surveys, counter-intelligence surveys, SIGSEC and COMSEC surveys, ELSEC surveys, etc., all security services are conducted with a multi-disciplined approach - usually a team composed of experts of all security disciplines. Their reports are then made available to the Commander. The Army has been experiencing success because he has a greater degree of confidence in the results of same. The security posture, therefore, at all echelons

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of command have been improved. More emphasis is placed, as a result, on the overall security threat and solution and command response.

4. OPSEC in the Army is covered by AR-530-1. An interpretation of that philosophy as quoted by the Sixth U. S. Army as follows:

OPSEC is a management philosophy and methodology which includes the necessary and appropriate actions a commander takes to deny an adversary information about planning, ongoing, or completed operations. When properly applied, the process results in the protection of military operations and activities by identifying and eliminating or controlling access to information which is susceptible to hostile exploitation. A commander thereby denies an adversary a tactical or strategic advantage.

5. As you are aware, in the past, both civilian and military departments have been guilty of conducting surveys which really touched on only one aspect of the problem, i.e. physical security, etc. The OPSEC philosophy tackles all security problems within a multi-disciplined framework. Security is thereby enhanced because the non-security command elements involved are aware of the advantages of this approach and have greater confidence in the security recommendations that result from same.

6. I therefore strongly recommend that ACSI be requested to provide a briefing to the next Security Committee group on their concept and the utilization of OPSEC. It is suggested that this briefing be conducted by the 902nd MI Group Commander, Colonel Littlefield or his Chief of the Special Security Detachment, LTC Keenan. I would be happy to make the necessary arrangements if you approve of same. In this connection, it is respectfully suggested that Merrill Kelly be contacted to obtain his approval before any contact is made with the 902nd.

7. In conclusion, I am convinced that the Army procedure with respect to OPSEC should be implemented by all DOD components. I also respectfully suggest that civilian components of the Intelligence Community could also benefit by the introduction of this concept with some modifications.

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